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Piketty’s bestseller has deservedly received much praise as well as some substantial 
criticism. The book mixes excellent characteristics with important limitations. 
However, it would be churlish not to start this discussion by recognizing the 
impressive achievements of this text.  It is a significant example of historical 
scholarship and reveals long-term wealth accumulation among the richest groups in 
many societies. The book confirms that inequality in most states has increased since 
1980 as wealth has accumulated at the top, and that this reflects a long-term U shaped 
pattern in the share of capital in national income. Both are explained by a law of 
capitalism in which the rate of return to capital (r) is greater than the rate of output 
growth (g). The consequence is a return to ‘patrimonial capitalism’, which has 
proceeded by stealth with limited public discussion.  This book questions this process, 
highlights some of its unwelcome undemocratic and petrifying consequences, and 
changes the terms of debate around long-run inequality (Krugman, 2014). The book 
warns that modern economies are on course to an extreme and unprecedented 
concentration of wealth in which the middle classes have to make do with stagnant 
real incomes. Moreover, the huge rewards of corporate ‘super-managers’ seen in 
recent decades are not justified by their unmeasurable contributions to productivity. It 
is a testament to the richness and depth of the book that it appears to be so many 
different things to different reviewers. Reviewers have highlighted various 
dimensions of the book, engaging with those things that they like, themes that they 
recognize, or even old enemies that they re-encounter in its pages (which range from a 
return to Marxism, a modern update of David Ricardo, to a thinly disguised 
neoclassical growth model). I will continue in this selective vein by focusing on the 
relationships between the text and some of the recent debates in evolutionary 
economic geography, particularly on how evolutionary economic approaches can be 
best reconciled and combined with a revived political economy. One of the most 
attractive features of Piketty’s book is its search for a return to a classical political 
economy, based on the recovery of a serial economic history of the longue durée. So 





Piketty’s comments on method and economics echo some important themes in recent 
economic geography. He criticises orthodox economics for its childish obsession with 
mathematics and argues for a political economy that engages with other social 
sciences, and yet retains a quantitative rigour and use of numbers to help the interests 
of the less powerful. His long term historical perspective indicates that there are 
similarities between the late nineteen the century and the current age. Consequently 
the worlds of Austen and Balzac may have surprising contemporary relevance and   
marriage and inheritance may become increasingly significant in a new Belle Époque.  
Underlying these similarities are his fundamental laws of capitalism which mean that 
the rate of return on capital, defined as all accumulated wealth, tends to be faster than 
the rate of growth. As Savage (2014) has argued, this represents a slow process which 
is a useful challenge to the presentism and excessive sense of speed and transition in 
much recent social science. With some resemblance to economic geographers’ 
engagement with path dependence, Piketty is also interested in how the past 
constrains the future. As accumulated wealth builds up and is passed down through 
the generations it tends to cement oligarchy and erode entrepreneurial, meritocratic 
and democratic values. Thus in his words “the past tends to devour the future” (2014: 
378 ). Inequality created in the past has a cumulative and disproportionate influence 
as inheritance dominates over earnings and wages.  
 
However, Piketty is less helpful in understanding the evolution of economic paths as 
his work is ambiguous both about their strength and the roles that institutions and 
politics play. In places he argues against deterministic views and contends that, since 
history always invents its own pathways, lessons from the past my not apply in the 
future. However, as critics have noted, his laws of capitalism appear deterministic, so 
that capital always transforms itself into rents “as that is its vocation, its logical 
destination” (115). On this basis, his predictions for the next century are confident and 
stark. Piketty is similarly contradictory on institutions. Despite admitting that that 
history of the distribution of wealth is deeply political and cannot be determined by 
economic mechanisms, ironically he prioritises these slow economic mechanisms. 
They have only been interrupted during the twentieth century by two World Wars 
which destroyed capital and yielded a new relatively wealthy middle class, thereby 
creating the illusion that capitalism lowers inequality as it matures. Current low tax 
rates are an equilibrium, in his view, that can only be broken by a shock.  Yet this 
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episodic view is inadequate and similar to punctuated equilibrium, and it does not 
explain why institutions are so important only during this exceptional period? Others 
have persuasively argued that capitalism is shaped more profoundly and continually 
by institutions so that we need to take regulatory choices more seriously (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2014; Stiglitz, 2014). Certainly, economic geography needs a better 
and more coherent view of regulatory institutions and how they are assembled and 
structured in specific times and places.  
 
Piketty calls for a long term history of economic change and he delivers a huge 
amount of data and graphs on wealth in France, Britain, Germany and the US. This is 
genuinely a long-term view but perhaps one that does not entirely persuade the reader 
that such a long-term perspective is necessary to understand the last few decades. To 
his credit, Piketty provides an inductive approach in which he attempts to develop 
history-friendly theory from long-term detailed descriptive observations. Despite the 
value of this strategy, his model lacks an evolutionary theory of economic change and 
falls short of a reconstructed political economy (Kunkel, 2014; Soskice, 2014). In 
some contrast to evolutionary economic geography which has been too micro-focused 
in recent years, Piketty’s Capital is at the other end of the scale, and provides a broad 
economic macro-account that leaves out causes and specific forms of political-
economic change at a meso-level.  To say that r exceeds g is not really a theory but 
something that needs to be explained (Harvey, 2014). While Piketty notes how the 
rise of ‘super-managers’ has led to intensified inequality since the 1970s he does not 
explain the other forces which have led to lower real wages such as the destruction of 
unions, outsourcing, deregulation of labour markets, and monopoly rents in the digital 
economy (Stiglitz, 2014; Harvey, 2014). The rise of ‘super-managers’ with huge 
salary rewards appears rather detached from his key macro-logics, and is explained 
only in terms of changing social norms and incestuous compensation committees in 
the confines of the board room, triggered by lower tax rates, rather than embedded in 
political forces and strategies.   Piketty’s macroeconomics asserts that the rate of 
economic growth and the rate of return on saving and investment are independent of 
each other. Capital accumulation relentlessly benefits from increasing returns and 
capital can be substituted for labour without end. Nevertheless both this high elasticity 
of substitution of capital for labour and relentless increasing returns are dubious and 
several critics point out that most of the evidence here is contrary to these claims 
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(Rognlie, 2014; Rowthorn 2014; Milanovic, 2014).  Furthermore, and perhaps most 
importantly, his understanding of capital as all types of wealth is too indistinct and 
lumpy, and fails to note that the build-up of wealth assets in recent decades is largely 
due to the rise of real estate assets and housing wealth (Rognlie, 2014). This raises the 
possibility, of course, that capital has been distracted from productive investment by 
the lucrative returns in speculative and property investments which may have created 
a scarcity of capital and thus a problem of under-investment rather than over-
accumulation (Harvey, 2014; Rowthorn, 2014).  
 
Piketty’s explicit engagement with economic geography is quite thin and incidental. 
As Jones (2014) argues, the roles that space and urbanisation play in the reproduction 
of capital need much more attention. In places we encounter the role of real estate 
rents in Paris but in general the text says little on how particular places and cities 
provide the conditions for the growth of certain types of capital. Globalisation also 
plays only a supporting role in the book and Piketty is more concerned about what is 
happening within advanced countries rather than global inequalities. This is partly 
because he believes that the piling-up of capital in China and oil states, and in their 
sovereign wealth funds, is less important than that within the rich West. However, he 
argues that, while privatization and the globalization of finance capital present 
investors with more opportunities for lucrative returns, global economic growth will 
slow down as the current phase of catch-up comes to an end. Indeed, he claims that 
the globalization of capital has produced convergence through the spread of 
technological knowledge, so that knowledge exchange is evening out the world 
economy. However, he predicts that economic growth will slow during the next 
century as the democratic transition spreads and as this phase of catch-up comes to an 
end. These claims still are highly questionable and premature for many states, and 
they are based on too simple a reading of globalization that skates over its uneven and 
contradictory effects. Here, we undoubtedly need more appreciation of the selective 
nature of structural change and economic growth, and the significance of 
developmental states. Moreover, as Soskice (2014) argues, the clustered ‘sticky’ 
locations of many knowledge-intensive global producers may provide more 




If distribution is to be central to understanding economic growth then this demands 
more analysis of the consequences of increasing inequality for economic growth, and 
an attempt to discuss whether there is an optimal level for entrepreneurial incentives. 
While Picketty hints that entrepreneurs all too quickly turn into rentiers, he does not 
consider arguments about whether excessive inequality obstructs and hinders 
economic growth. There is little sign of the growing evidence that inequality is 
harmful to economic growth (for example, see Dabla-Norris et al, 2015). Piketty 
explains inequality as the result of low growth, but there are no strong systemic 
feedbacks from inequality to growth. However, this weakens his case for a global 
wealth tax and for a progressive social state. The book argues that both would control 
excessive inequality and restore distribution, but doesn’t really convince on why they 
are necessary or how they should and could be used. He argues, for example that 
modern social states need to be modernised and reformed but his recommendations 
are quite vague. 
 
Piketty’s approach seems to assume that capital as wealth enjoys increasing returns 
everywhere, but at the same time increasing returns have a smaller effect on economic 
growth. Some of his critics balance this by reasserting the force of diminishing returns 
to increments of all types of capital. From the perspective of economic geography 
both these views seem too generalised and universal. A more geographical theory 
would look at the prevalence of both increasing and diminishing returns for different 
forms of capital and wealth, and how these are temporarily assembled and sustained 
in different times and places. Neither logic is predetermined and bound to win but 
both are based on the contextual and contingent interactions between technology, 
structural change, practices, institutions and political fortunes. Why is it that 
increasing returns in some types of capital predominate in some ensembles for a while 
but then run into diminishing returns? What explain these logics of growth and 
decline and how does inequality fit into the heart of these changes? The book opens 
up a series of key debates but the explanation of economic evolution is too macro, 
uniformitarian and deterministic. Capital is more contingent and more differentiated 
and institutionally embedded than Piketty suggests so that economic evolutions are 
more deeply integrated with places.  Having said all this, in illuminating the dark 
corners of the top one-percent, dispelling myths about capitalism’s distributional 
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benefits and in stimulating the debate on the need for greater global wealth 
transparency and taxation, Piketty’s book remains a key resource and an inspiration.  
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